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## E-ducating the gaze: the idea of a poor pedagogy

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Educating the gaze is easily understood as becoming conscious about what is ‘really’ happening in the world and becoming aware of the way our gaze is itself bound to a perspective and particular position. However, the paper explores a different idea. It understands educating the gaze not in the sense of ‘educare’ (teaching) but of ‘e-ducere’ as leading out, reaching out. E-ducating the gaze is not about getting at a liberated or critical view, but about liberating or displacing our view. It is not about becoming *conscious or aware*, but about becoming *attentive*, about paying *attention*. E-ducating the gaze, then, is not depending on method, but relying on discipline; it does not require a rich methodology, but asks for a poor pedagogy, i.e. for practices which allow to expose ourselves. One example of such practice is that of walking. Consequently e-ducating the gaze could be about an invitation to go walking. This idea is explored by way of a comment on two quotations, one by Walter Benjamin and one by Michel Foucault.

**Keywords:** gaze; walking; Walter Benjamin; pedagogy; attention

We walk, not in order to arrive at a promised land,  
but because walking itself is the revolution  
(John Holloway, *Zapatismo and the Social Sciences*)<sup>1</sup>

[For Foucault] to think always meant to think about the limits of a situation.  
But it also meant to see  
(Gilles Deleuze, *Michel Foucault, Critical Assessments*)

### Introduction

In thinking about educating the gaze in the context of ‘education and multicultural understanding’ we easily come to the idea that it should be about the way in which we might help students to arrive at a more open, better, more critical, emancipated or liberated view. We should help them to open their eyes, i.e. to become (more) conscious about what is ‘really’ happening in the world, to become aware of the way their gaze is itself bound to a perspective and a particular position. We should look for another, more adequate, critical perspective, which also takes into account the

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perspective of others. Educating the gaze, then, would be about becoming conscious and becoming aware, it would be about achieving a better understanding. However, in this article, I would like to explore a different idea. Indeed, I would like to understand educating the gaze not in the sense of *educare* (teaching) but of *e-ducere* as leading out, reaching out. I shall write of e-ducation and its variants (e-ducating, etc.) in order to keep this meaning in view. E-ducating the gaze is not about arriving at a liberated or critical view, but about liberating or displacing our view. It is not about becoming *conscious* or *aware*, but about becoming attentive, about paying *attention*. Consciousness is the state of mind of a subject that has or constitutes an object(ive) and aims at knowledge. Attention is the state of mind in which the subject and the object are brought into play. It is a state of mind which opens up to the world in such a way that the world can present itself to me (that I can ‘come’ to see) and I can be transformed. Attention opens up an atypical (and not an utopical or heterotopical) space: a space of possible self-transformation and self-displacement, i.e. a space of practical freedom. In my idea, e-ducating the gaze requires a critical research practice, which effects a practical change of ourselves and of the present we live in, not an escape from it (toward a vision of a better state from where we could judge the present). Such a critical research practice is not dependent on method, but relies on discipline; it does not require a rich methodology, but asks for a poor pedagogy, i.e. for practices, which allow us to expose ourselves, practices, which bring us onto the street, displace us. I want to elaborate what such a critical e-educational research practice is about by starting from an example: the example of walking (and copying). Consequently, e-ducating the gaze involves an invitation to go walking. I will explore this idea by way of a comment on two quotations. The first is a short but beautiful passage by Walter Benjamin, and the second a brief remark by Michel Foucault.

### **Walking: learning the power the road commands**

In ‘One-way street’ Benjamin writes:

The power of a country road is different when one is walking along it from when one is flying over it by airplane. In the same way, the power of a text is different when it is read from when it is copied out. The airplane passenger sees only how the road pushes through the landscape, how it unfolds according to the same laws as the terrain surrounding it. Only he who walks the road on foot learns the power it commands, and how, from the very scenery that for the flier is only the unfurled plain, it calls forth distances, belvederes, clearings, prospects at each of its turns like a commander deploying soldiers at the front. Only the copied text thus commands the soul of him who is occupied with it, whereas, the mere reader never discovers the new aspects of his inner self that are opened by the text, that road cut through the interior jungle forever closing behind it: because the reader follows the movement of his mind in the free flight of daydreaming, whereas, the copier submits it to command. (Benjamin 1979, 51)

I want to read this passage as an extremely precise indication of what a critical e-educational (research) practice could be about, revealing also why revolution lies in the act of walking and is not dependent on the promised land it allows us to enter. Benjamin indicates clearly what this walking has to do with seeing, with opening one’s eyes, with taking a new look (in German: *Ansicht*), which is not about arriving at a *particular* perspective or vision, but about displacing one’s gaze so that we are

‘(t)here’ and the ‘(t)here’ can present itself to us in its evidence and command us. Displacing one’s gaze so that one can see differently, can see what is visible (since the ‘distances, belvederes, clearings, prospects’ are not hidden, not *beyond*) with the result that the individual (the ‘I’ and ‘we’) can be transformed. That is exactly what walking is about: a displacement of the gaze that enables experience, not just as a passive undergoing (being commanded), but also as blazing a trail or path, a kind of cutting a road through.<sup>2</sup>

The point about walking is not that it would offer us a ‘better’ view (or ‘reading’) or a more true, more complete view, that it would allow us to transgress the limits of our perspective, but that it offers us, so to speak, a view beyond every perspective, a look that transforms us (and therefore constitutes experience), while its evidence commands us. It allows, Benjamin seems to imply, a look beyond every perspective since a perspective is always bound to a standpoint in the sense of a subjective position, i.e. exactly the position of a subject in relation to an object(ive). Walking is about putting this position at stake, it is about ex-position, being out-of-position.

Benjamin makes clear that there is a difference between walking a road and flying over it: a difference similar to that between copying a text by hand and reading (understanding) it. The difference is that it works differently, that its power is different. Walking the road means that the road imposes itself upon us with a certain authority, that it commands our gaze and presents us with a striking reality in its differences, an evidence that commands. It should be clear that Benjamin is not saying that the gaze we have on the road is different according to the viewpoint or perspective (the viewpoint down in the street, or up in the air), which could then lead to the advice that we should not only take the perspective from above, but also from below, every view/standpoint offering its own perspective (and maybe even implying that the one from below is better, more human, more true). So it is not about different visions or perspectives (which would be offered by a different *subject(ive) position*), although the difference between walking and flying has an effect on what we see and how we see. And he is not referring to the difference between a view from nowhere, or an objective viewpoint on the one hand and a subjective, lived and engaged viewpoint on the other hand. Rather, Benjamin is referring to a difference in the activity itself, a difference between walking and flying, copying and reading, as different ways of relating to the world, *relating to the present, to what is present*. This difference is a difference in power, in the *effect* of that activity on ourselves and on what is revealed. The one who flies, Benjamin says, only ‘sees,’ but the one who walks the road ‘learns of the power it commands’ (*erfährt von ihrer Herrschaft*) i.e. ‘experiences’ how some given thing comes to appear, is commanded to appear, how it presents itself to us, *becomes evident* and ‘commands our soul,’ and ‘cuts through.’ I understand the soul that Benjamin is referring to as the mortal self of action that is susceptible to transformation (and not a kind of substantial, real or deep or purely spiritual self).

Flying over a road (and reading it) makes the road part of a plane surface, a plain, which from the perspective of the flyer makes it appear to be situated against a horizon. The road appears as an object which obeys the same ‘laws’ as all the other objects appearing to a subject against a horizon in and on that plane i.e. as objects which can be explained, defined, ordered, identified (in relation to the subject), just like the whole reality (or present) around it. Objects behave according to laws (or reasons) imposed or supposed by the subject (i.e. in his or her intentionality).

The road then is subsumed under the laws of the perspective of the flyer and has no power over the flyer ('it is only the unfurled plain'), it cannot touch, cannot cut through him or her. The flyer acquires a certain knowledge, an object(ivity) revealed to a subject(ivity). An object(ivity) is something which appears from a certain perspective, which is read from a position related to the intention of a subject (a grasping of an object against the horizon of the subject's intention).

Walking then is not about attaining a certain perspective (for example that of the promised land), but, like copying by hand, it is about a totally different relation to the present, it is about physically delivering oneself, the commitment to following an *arbitrary* line, that is the road (or text) as 'cutting through' one's intentions, and exposing oneself to its command. This command opens a new perspective (*neue Ansichten*) upon ourselves, but also 'calls forth distances, belvederes, clearings, prospects': it presents us with an evidence beyond visions and perspectives.

Benjamin is thus suggesting that walking, just like copying, liberates our gaze, *opens our eyes* – which is itself of course also a very familiar *topos* in educational and philosophical thought – displaces our gaze, which is not the same as offering us a (new) perspective or vision. And it is not the revelation of a truth beyond what we (are accustomed to) see. To open our eyes is to get a look at what is evident; it is, as I would like to say, about being or becoming attentive, it is to expose oneself. Walking the road, like copying the text, are ways of exploring and relating to the present, which are in the first place e-ducative. They are forms of critical educational research ('critical' being here, in my idea, identical to 'e-ducational'). They constitute a kind of research practice, which is about being attentive, that is open to the world, exposed (to the text) so that it can present itself to us in a way, which commands us. This command is not the command of a tribunal, it is not the imposition of a law or principle (which we would be supposed to recognize or to impose upon ourselves), but the manifestation ('learning') of a power, which makes us move and thus paves the way. It is not directing us, not leading us to the promised land, but pushing us. It does not tell us where to go, but pushes us to move from where (and who) we are. The copying of the text is then not just a re-presentation, but a cutting through of the road. It is a paradoxical activity: to be commanded by something, which is not yet given, but on the way to being given, something which is literally presenting itself, in the course of the way that one is following. Copying a text as concrete activity is reproducing or recasting the text; which is not a matter of re-presenting, but of presenting it. In the same way, we could see walking a road as a mapping of the present, which does not give us an overview (and therefore mapping is not about representing a totality), but cuts the road through. Walking is at the same time traveling a way and paving a way, which *commands the soul*. Walking, one could say, is the physical activity of displacing one's gaze (i.e. leaving one's position, one's ex-position) along an arbitrary line, a trajectory that at the same time exists (and is recaptured) and is paved anew, a way for new perspectives, and so not leading to somewhere given before, but somewhere without a destination or familiar kind of orientation.

To walk is to gain a critical distance, which is not at the achievement of a meta-standpoint, but a distance in which one's 'soul' is dissolved from inside. It is a practice undertaken 'to risk one's very formation as a subject' (Butler 2001)<sup>3</sup> through a different relation toward the present – which is also why Foucault considers critique to be 'an issue of attitude' (1997). In this attitude toward the present that

present is not judged, that is, not brought before a tribunal, for example the tribunal of reason, or interpreted from a particular perspective; it is not evaluated against a vision of the promised land, but we expose ourselves to the present, implying a suspension of judgment and a physical setting-forth, which can dissolve us and, thus, liberate us.

In this way of looking at things critical e-educational research neither aims primarily at insight and knowledge, nor at increasing awareness or raising consciousness, but is a mode of research, which opens up an existential space, a concrete space of practical freedom: a space of possible self-transformation (Foucault 2001b)<sup>4</sup> which entails a liberation (i.e. an e-education) of the gaze and in that sense enlightens. In this kind of research knowledge is not meant for (improving our) understanding, but for ‘cutting,’ for concrete (bodily) inscription, and for transformation of who we are and how we live (Foucault 1997).<sup>5</sup> This research is characterized by a concern for the present and an attention to (or care for) ourselves in relation to that present, a concern to be present in the present, which is another way of indicating that the first concern of this research is to be attentive. To be attentive is a limit-attitude, which is not directed at limiting the present (by judging), but at exposing one’s limits and at exposing one at the limits. Walking, then, is a critical practice involving a limit-attitude that transforms us, not by making us conscious, but by making us pay attention. This brings us to a small remark of Foucault concerning the practice of critique. But let me first make a brief digression.

I cannot elaborate it here, but this kind of walking the road and copying the text as suggested by Benjamin are related to the ideas of mapping and cartography, which have been popular for some time and are now again attracting increasing attention (Bosteels 1996; Flynn 2005). What is interesting in this ‘cartographic turn,’ says Bosteels, is neither the increased interest in maps appearing in literary and artistic works, nor the tiresome use of the term ‘mapping’ as a mere synonym for ‘describing,’ but rather the explicit interpretation of cartography as an exemplary cultural activity with a seemingly intrinsic critical and often utopian – I would prefer to say *atopian* – potential. I think that approaching the idea of mapping starting from the activity of walking and of copying and *not of reading* (or flying over) are very helpful in getting beyond a rather sterile discussion on the issue of representation (and its validity) related to this idea of mapping as critical activity. Mapping is then not about reading and ordering or re-presenting, but about simultaneously recapturing and inventing, about copying and ‘cutting a road through.’ It should be clear that what I suggest here refers to a totally different idea of mapping from the one, which is apparently becoming popular in educational contexts. A good example is a recent study by Lambeir, which presents itself explicitly as a mapping, which can help to educate our gaze (Lambeir 2004; but see also for a similar idea of mapping: Crampton 2004). It is a study, which attempts to map ‘cyberspace’ as our present milieu. Lambeir states that wherever people face a confused and perhaps dangerous landscape, something is needed to enable them to make their way through it. Today, we seem ‘to lack a map that guides people through the foreign world...through the jungle...of the ongoing technological revolution’ (Lambeir 2004, 1). The maps would offer conceptual schemes or sets of ideas that frame the problems. The point of mapping then is first of all to make an overview of the landscape, to mark it and demarcate it, to take care that one is not

getting lost or disturbed. And making maps, as he says, implies remaining with two feet on the ground – which is obviously not the movement of walking – avoiding ways, which would lead us nowhere. I cannot develop it in detail here, but, as I noted, looking at mapping from what Benjamin says about copying and walking offers a totally different idea of mapping. Starting from that idea Lambeir's proposal would damage our vision; it would make us blind to the present and immune to transformation. It would make us inattentive.

### **To go walking and become attentive**

In a short reply to a letter in the French Newspaper *Le Matin* Michel Foucault approved Maurice Blanchot's remark '*que la critique commence par l'attention, la présence et la générosité* [that critique starts with attention, presence and generosity]' (Foucault 2001a, 762). I would like to see this remark, like the one by Benjamin, as a very fruitful indication of how to elaborate the idea of critical e-educational research. As I suggested earlier, such a critical research practice could be described, in a particular way, as the *art* of opening the eyes – liberating the gaze and mobilizing the gaze, i.e. the art of presenting, of making present. That means that it is not the art of representing, of raising consciousness, of critical reflection, of *becoming aware*, transferring or mediating knowledge or insights or overviews. What is at stake is the business of leaving behind the sovereignty of the judgement (of bringing the present before a court and its laws, relating it to a vision, projecting it against a horizon) and thus regaining, one could say, the sovereignty of the gaze which gives us something to see, makes it, so to say, evident. Critical research is then about e-educating the gaze as a matter of *becoming attentive*.

Critical e-educational research is not about making conscious or *being conscious*, but about attention and *being attentive*. To be attentive is to open oneself to the world. Attention is precisely to be present in the present, to be there – in the present – in such a way that the present can present itself to me (that it becomes visible, that it can come to me and I can come to see) and that I am exposed to it in such a way that I can be changed or 'cut' or contaminated, that my gaze can be liberated (through the 'command' of what is present). As such, attention makes experience possible.

Being attentive is the opposite of being absent (in English, 'attention' relates to 'attend' with its different connotations of care (e.g. attend to a patient), of 'being at' (e.g. attend church) of being present, of listening to, of going along with. Being absent means that we are not there, that we are captivated by the horizon of expectations, projections, perspectives, visions, views, images, dreams, i.e. our intentionality, which constitutes us as a subject in relation to an object(ive). We could say that the state of mind of someone who has an object(ive) or an orientation is the state of mind of a subject (of knowledge). To be attentive is not to be captivated by an intention or a project or a vision or perspective or imagination (which always give us an object and catch the present in a re-presentation). Attention does not offer me a vision or perspective, it makes an opening for what presents itself as evidence. Attention is lack of intention. Attention entails the suspension of judgment and implies a kind of waiting in the sense that Foucault wrote of critique as the art of waiting (in French too the idea of attention relates to the verb *attendre*), to wait.



Being attentive, according to Simone Weil, means that the will to subsume under a regime of truth is neutralized and that the supplementary energy with which the subject (of knowledge) projects itself onto the objects it confronts is exhausted. This particular kind of attention implies and enables a being-present, which brings the subject into play and defers the expectation of any benefit; and in that sense it is generous (Weil 1962; see also Waldenfels (2004); regarding exhaustion and the way it relates to attention see also Handke (1989)).

### **A poor pedagogy**

Critical educational research, i.e. research that opens the eyes, that puts us at a distance from ourselves, that opens the space of a possible transformation, is not dependent on subjugation to a method, or obedience to rules and procedures shared by a particular community (for example, the scientific community, or the community of rational beings, or the community of those who submit to the claims of communicative reason). It does not require a complex, rich methodology, but asks for a poor pedagogy, a pedagogy which helps us to be attentive, which offers us the exercises of an ethos or attitude, not the rules of a profession or the codes of an institution, not the laws of a kingdom or the stories and dreams of a 'mind in the free flight of day-dreaming' (Benjamin 1979). And therefore sending an invitation to go walking is not the same as requiring someone to submit under some laws or rules – for example, those of a method functioning as a tribunal or as a guarantee of reaching valid answers; or, in the words of Habermas, the conditions of communicative reason or the laws and principles of dialogue.

Critical educational research requires what I want to call a poor pedagogy, a poor art: the art of waiting, mobilizing, presenting. Such a poor art is in a certain sense blind (has no destination, no end, is not going anywhere, is not concerned with the beyond, has no vision of a promised land), it is deaf (hears no interpellation, is not obeying 'laws') and speechless (has no teachings to give). It offers no possibility of identification (the subject position – the position of the teacher or the student – is, so to say, empty), no comfort.

A poor pedagogy invites one to go outside into the world, to expose oneself, i.e. to put oneself in an uncomfortable, weak position, and it offers the means and support to do so. I think that it offers means for experience (instead of explanations, interpretations, justifications, representations, stories, criteria, etc.), means to become attentive. These are poor means, means, which are insufficient, defective, which lack signification, do not refer to a goal or an end. They are pure means, tracks leading nowhere and which therefore can lead everywhere: a *passe-partout*. (As Bataille writes: '*les moyens pauvres (les plus pauvres) ont seul la vertu d'opérer la rupture (les moyens riches ont trop de sens, s'interposent entre nous et l'inconnu, comme des objets recherchés pour eux-mêmes)*' (Bataille 1954, 29).<sup>6</sup>

A poor pedagogy offers means, which can make us attentive, which eliminate or suspend the will to submit oneself to a regime of truth (Fabian 2001)<sup>7</sup> or to submit oneself to an advantage or a profit. A poor pedagogy does not promise profits. There is nothing to win (no return), no lessons to be learned. However, such a pedagogy is generous: it gives time and space, the time and space of experience and of thought.



A poor pedagogy does not put under surveillance, does not monitoring, has no kingdom to guard over (the kingdom of science, of rationality, of morality, of humanity, etc.). It does not impose entrance conditions, but invites us to go and walk the roads, to go into the world, to copy the text, i.e. to expose ourselves. Walking the roads means literally to leave the comfort of home to go into the world. The world is the place, which belongs to no-one, which has no entrance gate which has to be put under surveillance. To go into the world, it suffices to make an effort (to go walking, copying). What is needed is the will to move and to exhaust the energy of projection and appropriation (which time and again establishes its own order or 'home'); what is needed is a concrete effort as a kind of disciplining of the body and the mind which is not a matter of normalizing our position, but in a sense weakens it. Walking and copying are such physical disciplining activities. Walking and copying are the names for all kinds of educative practices, which allow for experience and exposition. They imply giving up the comfort of a secure position (of an orientation, a good intention, an awareness, an explanation or a story).

A poor pedagogy is a pedagogy, which says: 'look, I won't let your attention become distracted, look! Instead of waiting for thrills and a denouement, for stories and explanations, look!' It impresses the gaze by offering trajectories, like arbitrary lines (roads, the lines of the text). It offers cuts, incisions, as lines that mobilize the gaze, take the gaze away, attract it, take it along. But the line does not define the gaze and does not offer a perspective.<sup>8</sup> This pedagogy depicts no horizon, offers no tradition, offers no representation; it draws a line which makes a cut. And what is revealed, then, what appears along the line, is not a defigured, chaotic world, which would need the right viewpoint (or overview or explanation). Walking along the line, along the road, is not a matter of getting lost in Plato's cave. No, the line is an opening cut *in* the world *onto* this very world. So the walking does not need a destination or orientation, which would give it its (true) meaning, of which the ideal of course would be arrival. What an arbitrary line offers is not a distorted, incomprehensible, false or chaotic reflection of the world, but an opening to the world. Walking along that line is walking without a programme, without an end, but with a burden, a charge: what is there to see and to hear? And what to do with it? How to respond to it?

A poor pedagogy offers means that help us to take the position of the vulnerable, the uncomfortable position, being exposed. As soon as one leaves this exposed position, the gaze changes and we are back to objects (and objectives) appearing to subjects, back to knowledge instead of experience. (I don't doubt the importance of knowledge, but critical educational research is not about knowledge aimed at understanding, but at cutting, at possible self-transformation – see above.) A poor pedagogy offers means for getting out of position, so that the soul (the self) can be commanded by the road, like the road paved by the text at the moment that I copy the text. Copying like mapping, is the business of following a trajectory, which is not directed by the leading ideas or by the (hypo)theses of the copier or the mapper.

This pedagogy presents the world, offers it 'evidence' – 'not what is evident in what is simply given (plainly or empirically), but what is evident in what shows up when one takes a look . . . [which] is far removed from a vision that is merely sight-ful (that looks in order merely "to see"): what is evident imposes itself as the activation of looking (*elle s'impose comme la mise en puissance d'un regard*).' 'Evidence always

comprises a blind spot in its very obviousness: in this way it leans on the eye. The “blind spot” does not deprive the eye of its sight: on the contrary, it makes an opening, a possibility, for the gaze and it puts pressure upon it to look’ (Nancy 2001, 12). It is this pressure, which the pedagogy exerts: it *presses*. And the blind spot could be seen as the (arbitrary) line, which makes the opening for the gaze. A poor pedagogy spells out the need to look and to make use of one’s eyes: the evidence and the certainty of a gaze, which is mobilized, a gaze as regard for the world and its truth. Which is not the truth about the real, but the truth that comes out of the real – the truth lies not in a thesis or representation, but in the experience. It is to represent – to give again – the real (which is not simply given), to ‘realize’ it (see Benjamin), i.e. to look at it and to regard it, to respect it. ‘In the end, looking just amounts to thinking the real, to testing oneself with regard to a meaning one is not mastering.’ A critical pedagogy does not capture the gaze, but requires it, mobilizes it, animates it, so that the gaze is not imprisoned, but can be seduced and taken away by what is evident.<sup>9</sup> And the evidence is not what is simply given, but what *comes* to appear when the gaze cares for the present instead of bringing it before a court or tribunal.

To walk along a road implies a possible transformation (‘the command of the soul’), the ‘subject’ of that walk is the subject of experience and therefore is in a certain way no subject (that has an object and an orientation). To put it differently: the subjects of experience and the subjects of attention are particular kinds of subjects. They do not subjugate themselves to the tribunal of (qualitative, quantitative) scientific research, or to the tribunal of communicative reason, or the requirements of dialogue, but are under the command of the present that is always to come. And we know from Benjamin that the walker, like the copier, is not listening to ‘the movement of his mind in the free flight of daydreaming’ (i.e., what the reader is doing, the one who understands and interprets: listening to the commands of his ‘I’). In this sense, the gaze of the ‘I’ is also liberated and not subjective or private although it is certainly personal (and attached to the body), involving ‘us,’ involving our soul.

And that, I think, is precisely what is at stake in critical educational research as a matter of ‘opening our eyes’: the opening of an existential space, a space for practical freedom.

## Notes

1. [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Zapatismo+and+the+social+sciences+\(1\).+\(Polemic\).-a094462849](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Zapatismo+and+the+social+sciences+(1).+(Polemic).-a094462849).
2. There is of course a whole literature on walking as a research tool, as a ritual, as performance, as intervention, as a tool for sharing insights and as embodiment of the critical process (see for example, University of Illinois (2005), Le Breton (2000); Solnit (2002)). Walking straight, arbitrary lines is a practice also well known in art (see for example, Long (2002), or Adams and Malone (2003); see also Careri (2002); Davila (2002). Referring to Enlightenment, Jacques Rancière once noted that one of the essential budget posts of the emancipated individual was the cost of shoes, ‘for the emancipated man is a man who walks and walks, moving around and conversing, putting meaning into circulation and promoting the movement of emancipation’ (Rancière 2007, 51).
3. In this context also see Thoreau (1980) and more particularly Cavell (1999). Cavell develops, for example, the idea of ‘what the soul’s ‘attraction’ is to its journey . . . ; of how

to picture such journeying (Emerson's word for it is taking steps, say walking, a kind of success(ion), in which the direction is not up, but on, and in which the goal is decided not by anything picturable like the sun, by nothing beyond the way of the journey itself – this is the subject of Emerson's 'Experience' (10); 'having a 'self' is a process of moving to, and from, nexsts' (12).

4. Cf. 'ouvrir une espace de liberté, entendu comme espace de liberté concrète, c'est-à-dire de transformation possible' (Foucault 2001b, 126).
5. Cf. 'This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.'
6. 'Poor means (the very poorest) have the singular virtue of effecting a radical break (rich means are too full of meaning: they obstruct the space between us and the unknown, like things sought for their own sake).'
7. Talking about anthropological research 'looking' at the other, Fabian suggests that maybe our best research is done, while we are 'out of our minds,' that is while we relax our inner controls, forget our purposes, let ourselves go. It is the ecstatic side, which is no 'method,' he says, but the need of passion – 'as drive and suffering, terror and torture' – being a condition for really seeing (Fabian 2001).
8. I have in mind concrete mapping projects in post-conflict or post-war cities (Tirana, Sarajevo, Bucharest, Belgrade, Kinshasa) where I had students walking for several days and nights along arbitrary lines throughout the whole city.
9. An invitation to go walking is an invitation to share a (limit-) experience. But we have to be very careful, when we refer to 'evidence' and 'evidence of experience.' See, for example, Scott's very convincing critique of the assumption that experience would offer an evidence in which something would become visible (Scott 1991). However, as will have become clear, hopefully, the way in which I use 'experience' and 'evidence' here is displacing these terms in another register, an existential one and not an epistemological or methodological one.

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