

---

# Territory and Ritornello: Deleuze and Guattari on Thinking Living Beings

*Arjen Kleinherenbrink*     Radboud University Nijmegen

---

## **Abstract**

The concepts of territory and ritornello cannot be separated from one another, despite the fact that scholarship tends to restrict the former to discussions of politics and the latter to discussions of art. Deleuze and Guattari deploy the combination of territory and ritornello, along with associated notions such as rhythm, milieu, counterpoint and force, as a method to describe and understand the formation, existence and relations of living beings. They understand ‘life’ to also include a variety of nonorganic entities, such as social formations. Territory and ritornello provide a philosophical alternative to understanding the existence of beings in terms of an immutable, unchanging transcendent structure, such as divine revelation, politico-economic ideology or cultural identity. As such, this conceptual pair is a necessary element in translating Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphysical commitment to immanence and univocity into ethical and political theory and practice.

**Keywords:** territory, ritornello, chaos, earth, cosmos

## **I. Introduction: Thinking Living Beings**

The ritornello is a concept to help think of the existence of living beings in a reality ‘devoid of so-called natural affinity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 348). It is a key to aid in understanding and describing our existence within the framework of a philosophy of immanence, one in which we are denied a natural, privileged place within or above nature. Though the concept is developed in *A Thousand Plateaus*, arguably

*Deleuze Studies* 9.2 (2015): 208–230

DOI: 10.3366/dls.2015.0183

© Edinburgh University Press

[www.eupublishing.com/journal/dls](http://www.eupublishing.com/journal/dls)

the most widely read work in the respective oeuvres of Deleuze and Guattari, it has received relatively scant attention in comparison to some of the book's more infamous neologisms.<sup>1</sup> Such relegation to a minor role runs counter to Deleuze and Guattari's intentions. In a text from 1988, Deleuze declares that he and Guattari 'tried to make the ritornello one of our main concepts' (1995: 137). In an interview from 1991, when asked if he and Guattari managed to create any philosophical concepts, Deleuze answers 'how about the ritornello? We formulated a concept of the ritornello in philosophy' (2007: 381). Guattari (2011) included a chapter titled *The Time of Ritornellos* in the first part of *The Machinic Unconscious* and dedicated the entire second part of that work to an analysis of Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* in terms of ritornellos. He later addressed the concept once more in the essay *Ritornellos and Existential Affects* (Guattari 1990). All this suggests that ritornello is a *central* concept in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, and indeed there are at least two compelling reasons to argue that it deserves a place at the forefront of contemporary scholarship on their work.

The first reason is exegetical. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 300) insist that the construction of territories is *essentially* related to ritornellos. On their account, the one cannot be thought without the other.<sup>2</sup> However, though the notion of territory has received wide attention in Deleuze scholarship, its connection to ritornello is often ignored. Territory tends to be connected solely to politics of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, and discussions of ritornellos are largely confined to work on art and aesthetics.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, though *A Thousand Plateaus* contains an extensive account of the inextricable relation between ritornello and territory, research concerning or departing from this work rarely, if at all, mentions the two in conjunction.<sup>4</sup> As long as the essential relation between territory and ritornello is not reaffirmed, both concepts run the risk of being misunderstood. For example, Deleuze and Guattari's insistence that the formation of a territory should be understood in *musical* terms will then be seen as a 'mere' terminological quirk, not as a precise philosophical argument.

This would be a rather minor and technical point, were it not for the fact that it immediately leads to the second, far more important reason to revalorise the ritornello: understanding territory in the light of ritornello and vice versa is a crucial step in drawing the ethical and political consequences of Deleuze and Guattari's metaphysical commitments. As is well known, Deleuze and Guattari subscribe to a flat, univocal ontology. They reject any supreme principle, abstract truth, historical progression or transcendent entity that unifies or legislates

over all of Being: 'there is no form or correct structure imposed from without or above but rather an articulation from within' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 328). They urge us to think reality as a patchwork of machines or assemblages, with the only *necessity* being the *contingency* of the emergence, functions, transformations and eventual demise of entities. A logical corollary of such a position is the rejection of any dichotomy that places Man in opposition to Nature or World.<sup>5</sup> Man can neither be upheld as a privileged agent of truths of reason, divine revelation or politico-economic destiny tasked with forging a passive World into what it 'ought' to be, nor can Nature be a forgotten harmonious unity to which we must seek to return.<sup>6</sup> However, when people are placed on equal ontological footing with pebbles, chainsaws, and tornados, an urgent question immediately rears its head: *how to think the existence of the living being?* Even if the being of human beings is machinic, it is by no means automatic. How does the living being stake out a place for itself if not guaranteed a place in the world by some principled sovereignty or taxonomical destiny? Moreover, if the human being loses its privileged position in Being, important ethical and political decisions must nevertheless still be made.<sup>7</sup> Since there can be no transcendent rules or truths on which to ground such decisions for Deleuze and Guattari, a different approach is required, one that respects the demand for univocity while at the same time doing justice to the vast and obvious differences between the modes of existence of people (and other living beings) as opposed to, say, sand. Such an approach must start with a description of *how* living beings create a space for themselves to maintain their existence, a conceptual framework to grasp their contingency when there is no longer any recourse to a philosophical, religious or political 'One'.<sup>8</sup> This is what the conceptual couple of territory–ritornello is designed for.<sup>9</sup> The two notions and their associated concepts provide a *method* to analyse, on a case-by-case basis, how living beings as a subset among assemblages are situated in and dependent on the machinic patchwork of reality, a method to inform any ethical or political project, or more broadly any thoughtful interaction with our surroundings, that wishes to remain true to the demands of immanence and univocity.

There are thus two tasks to perform.<sup>10</sup> The first is the reunification of territory and ritornello. To capture the intimate relation between the two, Deleuze and Guattari use the vocabulary of the Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll, who understands life as unfolding in relations of reciprocal determination with an environment in terms of 'musical laws of nature'. According to von Uexküll, different species

serve as motifs and counterpoints for each other and he argues that musical terminology applied to animal behaviour is not a metaphor, but the *literal* form by which the dynamics of life should be understood. Species are not predetermined to any particular destiny, but instead emerge from and engage in contingent and aleatory selections of counterpoints and encounters. Von Uexküll (2001a; 2001bb38) argues that animals are surrounded by a shifting *Umwelt* or ‘island of the senses’, a dance or score that serves to simplify and stabilise the totality of a creature’s surrounding world. Hence the concrete situation and behaviour of a living thing becomes the primary source of knowledge about that thing, rather than relying on strict classifications in species and genera. Von Uexküll’s musical terminology provides Deleuze and Guattari with the means to describe and analyse the conditions of living things without resorting to transcendent principles.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, they will go beyond Von Uexküll’s theory by insisting that ‘territorial assemblages’ characterised by ritornellos concern more than just *biological* life.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, as their thought demands, Deleuze and Guattari completely eliminate any notion of unified Nature or holistic World in favour of a reality characterised by three types of forces: those of Chaos, of the Earth, and of the Cosmos. The second task is to sketch how this conceptual framework of territory and ritornello allows us to properly think and observe the contingency by which living beings construct a home for themselves, and subsequently how this can serve as a starting point for ethical and political deliberations.

## II. Rhythm, Milieu and Forces of Chaos

Territories and ritornellos are ‘built’ from what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘milieus’ and ‘rhythm’, which are in turn constructed from ‘forces of chaos’ (1987: 312, 313). Chaos refers to the fact that since reality lacks an overarching organising principle, *nothing has a natural place*. This is what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they declare ‘first, that there is no beginning from which a linear sequence would derive [...]. Second [...], there must be an arrangement of intervals, a distribution of inequalities [...]. Third, there is a superposition of disparate rhythms’ (1987: 329). For example, no twig is naturally attuned to being part of a nest, and nothing that grows is naturally meant to be converted into flesh and muscle. Such conversions take *work* or what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘*consolidation*’. Reality is thus a plethora of forces of chaos insofar as every living thing must select components for its territory (and for

its own body) from an environment in which nothing is 'ready-made'. Even after the ultimate formation of a territory, there are three obvious senses in which the forces of chaos always remain 'knocking at the door' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 352). First, any component may rot, wear or collapse, threatening a territory with dissolution. Second, something from the outside may disrupt or destroy the space of a living thing. Third, since no component belongs naturally to a milieu or territory, it always retains a measure of 'autonomy' or 'surplus value' such that it can escape or be captured by a competitor or an unlucky event. This is why even the most basic milieu always remains a *fragile* centre (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 312).

A milieu is thus a semi-stable selection from chaos. For instance, we construct a sonorous milieu when focusing on a particular conversation in a crowded, noisy room, an act that will drown out all other voices and reduce them to background noise. A milieu is always a 'synthesis of unification' (Deleuze 1990: 102). In the noisy room, a milieu might just as well be constructed by simultaneously listening to two conversations half-heartedly or by staring out a window while listening to the music. What matters is that milieus concern the creation of a certain measure of unity that is not at all necessary: the view from the window and the music in the background have no relationship whatsoever with each other, unless drawn into one within a milieu.<sup>13</sup>

A milieu introduces a degree of sameness by drawing together heterogeneous components.<sup>14</sup> A milieu is an ongoing contingent selection and 'the element of an action which passes from more to less differentiated' (Deleuze 1994: 225), but *also* 'a radical beginning, an absolute end, a line of the steepest slope' (Deleuze 1986: 124). These seemingly opposed statements can be reconciled by understanding that a milieu always creates the *experience* of a beginning and an end. I start and stop listening to a conversation at specific moments, but they were already in progress before I started paying attention and will continue after I have left. Even though there is always more to the world than that which is presented in a milieu, the world necessarily and *only* expresses itself in a variety of milieus, because only a milieu can distinguish something from chaos (Deleuze 1986: 99). Hence, 'every individual experience presupposes, as an *a priori*, the existence of a milieu in which that experience is conducted, a species-specific milieu or an institutional milieu' (Deleuze 2004: 19). There are various aspects to any milieu. First, there is an exterior formed by relevant components in the immediate material surroundings of a thing (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 49). For instance, crystals depend for their growth on an exterior

milieu of intermolecular vapour that can be crystallised, animals depend on food to maintain their bodily constitution and even the conversation in the noisy room depends on speakers and sounds to maintain its existence. Every milieu relies on material inputs from an exterior that are not necessarily or automatically attuned to maintaining the milieu's existence. Rather, they are drawn into it by contingent encounters and hence milieus exist in series of discontinuous states of metastability (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 50). Second, an interior milieu concerns internal components and regulatory principles, for example the system formed by the human blood vessels and the heart. Any milieu taken as internal in relation to exterior materials is always itself an exterior milieu in relation to its own interior substances (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 50). So as part of the internal milieu of human bodies, the arteries are simultaneously the external milieu for individual blood cells. The third aspect of a milieu is the membrane, limit or 'zone' where materials from the exterior milieu pass into the interior milieu and vice versa: the 'annexed or associated milieu' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 51). Deleuze and Guattari draw upon the work of the physician J. H. Rush when writing that this third 'annexed or associated milieu' is what prevents an organism from suffocating by allowing it the 'capture of energy sources, the discernment of materials, the sensing of their presence, and the fabrication or nonfabrication of the corresponding compounds' (1987: 51).<sup>15</sup> This third aspect of a milieu is where its surrounding materials and internal functions *interact* and examples include respiration, perception and response. A milieu's interactions 'divide a single milieu of exteriority among themselves as a function of different forms' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 52). For example, a single apple can be taken up as visual input by perception, as an object to be lifted by the hand, and as food by the mouth. Hence Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 55) conclude that the evolutionary process of fish leaving the seas for land is a case of an organism leaving its associated milieu: the organism leaves its habitual patterns of interaction with an exterior milieu.<sup>16</sup> Even though milieus provide constancy and coherence, the third aspect of the milieu ensures that there is, by definition, a hazardous element of chance and contingency and that no milieu is ever fully closed:

Since the associated milieu always confronts a milieu of exteriority with which the animal is engaged and in which it takes necessary risks, a *line of flight* must be preserved to enable the animal to regain its associated milieu when danger appears. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 55)

One can for example imagine an antelope (its body taken as the interior milieu) fleeing to another part of a field (exterior milieu) after spotting a predator in order to resume grazing (annexed milieu). All in all, Deleuze and Guattari conclude that ‘the living thing has an exterior milieu of materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, and an annexed milieu of energy sources and actions–perceptions’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 312). Milieus are always *directional* and *functional* insofar as they concern *where* diverse material inputs are drawn together and *what* actions they will perform or will be performed on them (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 315). Yet as said, the third aspect of the milieu guarantees that it is never fully disconnected from the chaos that threatens it with dissolution: ‘The milieus are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion. Rhythm is the milieus’ answer to chaos’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 313). So what is rhythm? Deleuze and Guattari answer that ‘there is rhythm whenever there is a transcoded passage from one milieu to another, a communication of milieus, coordination between heterogeneous space–times’ (1987: 313) and that rhythm concerns ‘the Unequal or the Incommensurable that is always undergoing transcoding’ (1987: 313). This shifts the question of rhythm to that of coding and transcoding. Coding is the process by which a thing or flow receives meaning. For example, Deleuze understands a woman’s hair as a flow that will change (in length, colour and so on) during her life. At different times this hair flow will be given different codes by wearing it in certain ways: hair can have a ‘young girl code’, ‘widow code’ or ‘married woman code’ (Deleuze 1971). All coding is always *transcoding*, because Deleuze and Guattari do not subscribe to a hylemorphic model in which unformed matter receives a form. Instead, everything proceeds between ‘blocks of wrought matter’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 329), so that coding one thing is always the transformation of another coded thing, as when a spider transcodes a fly by consuming it. Deleuze and Guattari deliberately choose the term ‘rhythm’ to emphasise that transcoding is characterised by contingency and elasticity: ‘It is well known that rhythm is not meter or cadence, even irregular meter or cadence, there is nothing less rhythmic than a military march’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 313).<sup>17</sup> Why is rhythm not meter or cadence? We have already seen the answer: *meter* would suggest a blind regularity that operates on the world, whereas such a thing is impossible when everything is characterised by contingency, when there is no natural attunement among elements, and when each component retains a chaotic aspect of autonomy and surplus value.<sup>18</sup> ‘Rhythm’ refers to discontinuous series of events and

fragmented parts of time characterised by disturbances and changes, rather than to such predictable harmony (Deleuze 1988: 76; Deleuze 2000: 26, 113, 123). Imagine a bee's daily route to a field of flowers. It is precisely the fact that the bee can dodge obstacles, take little detours and choose different flower milieus to enter each day, depending on what is most adequate given the circumstances, that reinforces his milieu against chaos. The rhythm is not the route or the regularity, but the variation in the comings and goings within a milieu:

A milieu does in fact exist by virtue of a periodic repetition, but one whose only effect is to produce a difference by which the milieu passes into another milieu. It is the difference that is rhythmic, not the repetition . . . (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 314)

This is also the point of their declaration that 'rhythm is never on the same plane as that which has rhythm' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 313). Once again, it is emphasised that the thing that has rhythm (a bee, a person) has to *consolidate* or *conquer* such variation, because nothing *naturally* pertains to it. As Grosz notes, rhythm is therefore never entirely within one's control. It is something constituted by the capacities of a being in reciprocal determination with the affordances and events in its environment. Hence, rhythm 'runs through all of life' in connecting living things to both nonorganic and organic entities in a series of contingent encounters (Grosz 2008: 18). If milieus concern *what* happens *where*, rhythms are about *how* and *when* things within and between milieus happen, and hence the flexibility and survivability of a milieu is a rhythmic concern. If milieus primarily refer to spatial arrangements and the constitution of components, rhythms are the 'particular temporal form' that maintains a certain measure of continuity and coherence (Grosz 2008: 47, 48).

### III. Ritornello, Territory and Forces of the Earth

Milieus and rhythms do not yet constitute a territory. The pure fact of a bee making its varying ways to various flowers does not yet mark routes and destination as *its*. Bare movements of living things taken in themselves are not yet really distinct from a rock tumbling down a hill.<sup>19</sup> The creation of a territory requires more and this is precisely the ritornello:<sup>20</sup> 'In a general sense, *we call a ritornello any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes*' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 322). Leaving aside motifs and landscapes for the moment, a ritornello drawing a territory



thus consists of ‘matters of expression’ that are constructed from milieus and rhythms. There is expressivity when the actions and movements of a living being become involved in the management of distances from other living things.<sup>21</sup> The bodily features and behaviours of a living being are all part of their own or interrelated milieus and rhythms, but as soon as their sounds, colours, products or mere presence becomes a ‘mark’ for other living beings, there is a ritornello:

territorial excrement, for example, in the rabbit, has a particular odor owing to specialized anal glands. Many monkeys, when serving as guards, expose their brightly colored sexual organs: the penis becomes a rhythmic and expressive color-carrier that marks the limits of the territory. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 315)

Ritornellos are signatures in the world and the expression of such signatures entails the formation of a domain. The territorialising movement of ritornellos logically precedes language and culture: the entire process starts with experimental and contingent expressions, postures, gestures, sounds and colours. This is why a child humming a tune in the dark already performs a territorialising act: humming is a ritornello insofar as it expresses a safe zone or a kind of sonorous shelter, even if the child is the only one listening.<sup>22</sup>

How does a ritornello or expressivity emerge? Since a ritornello takes the rhythms between milieus for its elements, its creation closely resembles the construction of a rhythmic milieu. First, there is the construction of an expression to create a ‘calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311). In this first aspect the ritornello *uses* milieus and rhythms as its components, but it never completely *controls* them. As said, milieus (and *their* components) retain a measure of autonomy and can always give out or be taken away. In the formation of a territory, milieus become what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘*infra-assemblages*’. If the milieu is ‘below’ the ritornello, it is because that which is used for an expression never ceases to lead a life of its own (a bird may use a leaf as a territorial marker, but the being of the leaf and all that it can undergo is never reduced to this expressive function).

Second, when such a centre has been created, there is the organisation of this space: ‘... components are used for organizing a space, not for the momentary determination of a center. The forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do. This involves an activity of selection, elimination and extraction ...’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311). In order to endow its existence with a certain

robustness, a territory must make its components function in one way or another, whether it is a bird's nest meant to ward off competitors and lure mates, or a human settlement that can only function successfully when inflows and outflows of food, excrement, messages and visitors are organised. In other words, it entails the construction of a sieve. As with rhythms and milieus, a ritornello thus remains fundamentally open to its outside, which always harbours an element of danger: 'A mistake in speed, rhythm, or harmony would be catastrophic because it would bring back the forces of chaos, destroying both creator and creation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311). So a territory is built from (parts of) milieus and rhythms that have become expressive. Territories can be thought to have the same relation with ritornellos that milieus have with rhythms: the former primarily concerns *what* happens *where* and the latter constitutes *how* things happen and *when* they do so. Like the milieus from which it is constructed, a territory has three aspects: 'an exterior milieu, an interior milieu, and an annexed milieu. It has the interior zone of a residence or shelter, the exterior zone of its domain, more or less retractable limits or membranes, intermediary or even neutralized zones, and energy reserves or annexes' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 314).<sup>23</sup> From the point of view of territory, milieus cease to be directional and functional, and, through the ritornello, become dimensional and expressive instead: colours, sounds and postures now mark where a territory begins and ends, who lives there, who may enter and so on.<sup>24</sup> Ritornellos and territories hence do not primarily emerge from conscious decisions or actions, but rather from systems of *signs*:

Perceptions and actions in an associated milieu, even those on a molecular level, construct or produce *territorial signs* (indexes). This is especially true of an animal world, which is constituted, marked off by signs that divide it into zones (of shelter, hunting, neutrality, etc.), mobilize special organs, and correspond to fragments of code ... (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 55)

To return to the notion of codes, territorialisation concerns a lodging onto 'the margins of the code of a single species and [giving] the separate representatives of that species the possibility of differentiating' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 322). To take an example Deleuze and Guattari frequently use, bowerbirds decorate their territories and nests with elaborate assemblages of brightly coloured items. From a purely biological perspective all bowerbirds are coded alike: they have the same digestive system, bones and nervous system, they eat the same things, nest in the same environments and so on. It is only by expressing itself and making its mark by constructing a ritornello and territory that a

bowerbird differentiates itself from its kind, and this is only possible because of ‘margins of code’: the potential to function in expressive acts that the bird’s physical characteristics and behaviours have beyond their primordial functions. This ‘lodging’ refers to the entire process of milieus and rhythms becoming expressive in ritornellos. When ritornellos constitute a territory, four things happen: ‘... *territorializing marks simultaneously develop into motifs and counterpoints, and reorganize functions and regroup forces*’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 322). To start with the first two, a motif is an occurrence inside a territory, a recurring albeit possibly varying event or behaviour that is in the first place expressive: ‘we know that our dogs go through motions of smelling, seeking, chasing, biting, and shaking to death with equal enthusiasm whether they are hungry or not’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 317). Almost anything can become a motif, whether a nervous tic, an item of clothing or a kind of graffiti. Counterpoints are located outside a territory and operate autonomously from it. Nonetheless, the territory is constructed with them ‘in mind’. The sun is a counterpoint to nocturnal animals, a predator is a counterpoint to a grazing herd, and so on. Hence there is counterpoint when a certain rhythm or melody brings one or several milieus into contact with each other: ‘there is counterpoint whenever a melody arises as a “motif” within another melody’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 185). Taken together, motifs and counterpoints constitute a ‘style’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 319). To return to the example of a nervous tic as motif, there is *style* when this is related to a counterpoint (‘my left eye twitches and I start stammering whenever my boss walks in’). As a combination of milieu and rhythm components, a *style* concerns *what* happens *where* in which way (*how*) and for what reasons (*when*). It is therefore clear that a territory is not just a demarcation of a certain place. Rather, it is an intense centre in which living beings act out interrelated patterns of behaviour and as such is something that *happens*. A territory is therefore primarily an *act* or set of acts (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 314).

Territories also reorganise functions and regroup forces. Once pertaining to a territory, functions such as aggressiveness are no longer limited to procuring food or surviving a fight: they also start to control who and what gets to enter and leave a certain space. In addition, territories give rise to completely new functions such as building a place to live. The regrouping of forces seems especially relevant to the territorialisation of human existence as they concern what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘rites and religions’, which they take to mean that all the various aspects and events in a territory become associated with a

certain unity: 'the territory groups all the forces of the different milieus together in a single sheaf constituted by the forces of the earth' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 321). The forces of the earth differ from forces of chaos. 'Earth' should not be understood as reintroducing the notion of a unified World. Rather, it refers to another sense of the French '*terre*': the physical environment in which a being exercises its activities. When a territory and ritornello are formed, the living being gains a home whose existence it tries to maintain. In a sense, it gains 'its world', one that may differ vastly from that of other territorial assemblages. The forces of the Earth are the materials and the capacities of the living being and its territory, and these forces perpetually remain 'up for change', for example when a human being learns new skills or when a country enters a new phase of industrial development. Whereas the milieus are a territory's *infra-assemblage*, Deleuze and Guattari refer to these materials, capacities and the relations created between them as the *intra-assemblage* of a territorial ritornello. At this point, we must also note that Deleuze and Guattari venture beyond von Uexküll's theory of living beings. Von Uexküll intends to describe the existence of *biological* life, whereas for Deleuze and Guattari, a territorial assemblage can also concern nonbiological life such as 'extended family, rural communities, castes, corporations, et cetera' (Deleuze and Guattari 2007: 113).<sup>25</sup> 'Life' thereby becomes defined as an entity that uses materials as expressive signs (its forces of the earth) in order to maintain its own existence in a play of distances with other territorial entities and, more generally, in tension with forces of chaos. As a result, birds, primates and humans find themselves in the same category of territorial assemblages as nations and subcultures.

However, is it not more adequate to say that the construction of houses, national borders, a sense of unity within a group and the defence of a certain area create a territory, then to maintain that, conversely, it is the territory that allows for such phenomena and hence precedes them? Nevertheless, the latter is exactly what Deleuze and Guattari argue:

these functions are organized or created only because they are *territorialized*, and not the other way around. The T factor, the territorializing factor, must be sought elsewhere: precisely in the becoming-expressive of rhythm or melody, in other words, in the emergence of proper qualities (color, odor, sound, silhouette ...). (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 316)<sup>26</sup>

What, then, is the characteristic *activity* that constructs territories, that makes milieus and rhythms become expressive? *Art*, is what Deleuze and Guattari answer:

Can this becoming, this emergence, be called Art? That would make the territory a result of art. The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark. Property, collective or individual, is derived from that even when it is in the service of war and oppression. Property is fundamentally artistic because art is fundamentally *poster, placard*. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 316)

Any becoming-expressive of a gesture, posture, colour or sound is immediately artistic, making ‘architecture the first of the arts’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994b22: 187). Hence, art does not even wait for human beings to begin and as Eric Alliez (2004: 75) notes, this entails that all territory is an effect of art.<sup>27</sup> It is only when a territory is already present that houses, religions, trades and rituals can emerge. Furthermore, there can never first be a human subject that then constructs a territory. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari argue that subjectivity can only emerge from the interrelation of expressive qualities that constitute a territory. Hence the mark or signature does not refer to a person preceding it. Rather, it is by marking and signing that we become a subject insofar as a concrete territory will determine ‘who I am’:

The expressive is primary in relation to the possessive; expressive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and constitute a having more profound than being. Not in the sense that these qualities belong to a subject, but in the sense that they delineate a territory that will belong to the subject that carries or produces them. These qualities are signatures, but the signature, the proper name, is not the constituted mark of a subject, but the constituting mark of a domain, an abode. The signature is not the indication of a person; it is the hazardous formation of a domain. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 316; translation modified)

So as O’Sullivan concludes, it is not the subject that produces a territory. Rather ‘bird song, understood as a territorializing ritornello, produces a kind of home and thus a “subjectivity” for the bird’ (O’Sullivan 2006: 93). Any description of a human being abstracted from its concrete (territorial) environment and especially the (potential) marks and signs occurring between subject and territory is thus *empty* and will have little to say about what is of actual importance in a life. Social life, occupations, trades and the very notion of normality depend on the territory (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 321). A living being’s existence is a territorial play of distances (don’t get too close to the neighbour’s dog, shake this hand, wave to an acquaintance, don’t stare at her, stay

away from my lawn, move in with him, stay close to the children, and so on). This continuing series of encounters may have its regularities and coherence, but as with rhythm, what is most important about distances is their variation: 'critical distance is not a meter, it is a rhythm' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 320).

#### IV. Contingency, Home and Cosmic Forces

With the emergence of a territory a living being gains a *home* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 504). A home is not necessarily a house: it is quite obvious that the homeless often have a home and that nomads have a territory. A territory or home is neither created once and for all, nor is it ever fully closed in upon itself. Its continued existence is a matter of *work* and *change*, even though this may be characterised by a slowness that suggests eternal stability to human eyes. The final thing they account for is therefore the fundamental *openness* of a home. Such an idea of openness opposes our human tendency to hypostatise and universalise territorial assemblages, for example when the free market, the nation, 'our' people, or parts or even all of Nature are imagined as harmonious wholes that *ought* to forever exist in a certain way by some divine, historical or natural right. Deleuze and Guattari insist on territorial openness by declaring that a territory always already moves from its own assemblage onto an *interassemblage*, which they relate to 'deterritorializing onto the Cosmos' (1987: 337).

The notion of interassemblage refers to the fact that the components of a territory can simultaneously concern multiple ritornellos. Deleuze and Guattari give the example of a simple grass stem, functioning simultaneously as a part of a bird's own territorial assemblage *and* as an element in the courtship assemblage between a male and female bird. Any territory, and its components, is therefore always intertwined or meshed with other territories, as when nations contest each other over resources, corporations want to lay claim to the same customers, or various predators lurk around the same group of hapless herbivores. Such frictions, tensions, alliances and enmities are what Deleuze and Guattari call *cosmic forces*, and a territory is related to a Cosmos precisely insofar as it engages, through the course of its existence, with other assemblages. As with the forces of the Earth, the Cosmos does not refer to a unified whole. Rather, it refers to a heterogeneous play of differences between territorial assemblages. For example, the same antelope is different things to its own herd and the pride of lions lying in

wait. Such points of territorial overlap are what Deleuze and Guattari call *assemblage converters* or *components of passage* (1987: 325), because successful or failed ‘struggles’ over such points will determine how assemblages form and change.

A territory is therefore always in the process of deterritorialisation, in becoming what it was not before, perhaps even becoming something entirely new.<sup>28</sup> Any territorial assemblage needs to keep its always somewhat autonomous rhythmic components ‘in line’, preventing their deterritorialisation and upholding a degree of consistency among elements that are not naturally attuned.<sup>29</sup> In addition, a territory always needs to regenerate itself with new components that come from outside the territory.<sup>30</sup> This is why Deleuze and Guattari state that a territory is defined by an *intense centre* that is always *outside* of the territory, either in its future or in its exterior milieu (1987: 342). Such an intense centre drives or motivates a territory. To give some simple examples: vegetation orients itself towards the sun and towards nutrients in the soil, salmon perform pilgrimages to their breeding grounds, human societies orient themselves on expected future events and needs, and professions orient themselves on political and economic events relevant to their fields. It is precisely in this perpetual deterritorialisation towards an outside centre that a territorial assemblage is always ‘wedding’ the Cosmos, which is, encountering other territorial assemblages, other rhythms and milieus.

Such deterritorialisation onto the Cosmos is never without risk. A territory can get stuck in what Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘black hole’ (1987: 342). Two nations drawn into a war that ends in mutual destruction, a subculture falling prey to drug fads that systematically weaken or wipe out its members, lemmings that drown in large numbers during their migrations, ecosystems brought to the brink of destruction under the influence of corporate exploitation: the examples are not hard to come by.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, ‘black hole’ should not be equated to ‘evil’. As Deleuze and Guattari write, even the formation of any milieu whatsoever already *is* a black hole insofar as the milieu draws a set of heterogeneous components into a sphere of influence that makes them function in a certain way (1987: 342). Simultaneously, the Cosmos or the heterogeneous patchwork of assemblages is what grants the possibility of *freedom*. Guattari gives the example of baboons that abandon their assigned roles in the group to flee for their lives when a predator appears. Without the Cosmos or *plurality* of ways to assemble or function, every element would be perpetually stuck in its assemblage, and the universe would halt in a frozen snapshot.<sup>32</sup>

A healthy home or territory thus necessarily embraces contingency and openness.<sup>33</sup> This is precisely the point of the use of musical concepts such as ‘rhythm’, ‘counterpoint’, ‘motif’ and ‘ritornello’: to emphasise time and again that the success and continued existence of any home or territory fundamentally depends on its capacity (and that of those dwelling within it) to interact and change with its environment, not according to a preconceived plan, but in a contingent play of negotiation and incorporation. And has this not always been understood? It is exactly the refusal to engage with anything from outside and the desire to breathe only ‘recycled air’ from within one’s own space that makes us look with suspicion upon phenomena such as xenophobia, nationalism and gated communities.

## V. Conclusion: Ritornello as Method

Milieu, rhythm, territory, ritornello and their associated notions (infra-, intra- and interassemblage; forces of chaos, earth and cosmos; motif; counterpoint; assemblage converters; black holes) yield a conceptual framework to serve as a *method* for describing and understanding the conditions and relations of and between different living beings. Such life, as said, can also be nonorganic, for example in the case of social formations. This method is an *alternative* to viewing reality and basing decisions on transcendent principles.<sup>34</sup> Instead of applying a supposedly ultimate set of immutable religious, economic, political, philosophical or scientific principles to any and all situations, Deleuze and Guattari insist that ‘the first concrete rule for assemblages is to discover what territoriality they envelop, for there always is one [...]. Discover the territorial assemblages of someone, human or animal: “home”’ (1987: 503). Such study of territories in their variations and encounters forms what Guattari calls a ‘morphogenesis of assemblages’, a method to always prevent illegitimate essentialisations such as ‘hypostasizing the existence of a soul’, as well as recourse to ‘always the same politics of “far-off worlds” or “objects from above” that winds up reconstituting linear causalities’ or ‘a signifying structuralism accounting for all behaviors’ (2011: 115, 116, 126).

Returning to von Uexküll, perhaps the most valuable insight Deleuze and Guattari retain from his thought is that even though we can never *be* another living being, we can nevertheless observe the *being* of other beings, and create cartographies of their territories. The musical terminology surrounding the concepts of territory and ritornello is designed to draw up such maps. Instead of managing our own



territorial assemblages and those of others with rules that always remain transcendent to them, the concept of *ritornellos* urges that we move *inside* other assemblages as best we can, in order to better describe and understand them, and ultimately to base ethical and political decisions on the best information we have concerning the *real, material* circumstances of living beings.<sup>35</sup> Whenever we seek to understand a single territorial assemblage such as a herd of beasts, a multinational corporation, a subculture of young people, and also more complex convergences of several different territorial assemblages upon one issue (diverse nations and biotopes affected by climate change; political upheaval over contested resources, debates between religious and scientific assemblages clashing over the existence of fossils, and so on), the concept of *ritornello* pulls us *into* the situation. For example, in the case of a single territorial assemblage, these questions would include:

1. What are the milieus or components that constitute its infra-assemblage? What are the rhythms of these components? What measure of autonomy do they retain with regards to the territorial assemblage? What is the effect of their being part of this territorial assemblage on these milieus? Which of these milieus are redundant or replaceable, which ones are essential? What kinds of work does the living being have to do to make and keep its milieus part of its territory? What kind of chaotic forces threaten the milieus of this assemblage?
2. What kind of expressive functions do the various components of this assemblage have? What kind of effort is needed from the living thing to bring about this expressivity? How do the various expressive functions depend on and relate to each other in the territory's intra-assemblage? What kind of forces of the earth or capacities does this expressivity bestow on the living thing? What kind of motifs and counterpoints arise in and around the territorial assemblage due to its expressivity?
3. What kind of inter-assemblage do these counterpoints create? What other territorial assemblages are relevant to this one? What are the points of overlap or contestation? What kind of intense centres are relevant to the territory, towards what kind of outside, spatially or temporally, does it orient itself? What are the black holes in this outside that might hamper or annihilate the assemblage?

It has been said that the political Left is nowadays lacking a general approach to political, ecological, social and economic problems.

Whereas the Right, through the rise of populism and neo-liberalism, confidently deploys transcendent structures (particularly national identity, the invisible hand of the market, and orthodox religion) to realise its goals and strengthen its positions, the Left is increasingly being relegated to mere critique and resistance, perhaps at best scoring momentary victories, ‘slowing down the inevitable’ and creating temporary revolutionary ruptures in an increasingly conservative, global capitalist system. Perhaps the value or promise of the conceptual couple territory–ritornello (and of other conceptual frameworks that are structurally similar) lies precisely here: in the possibility of a method to map and understand reality as being immanent, heterogeneous and contingent, as a first step towards creating political and ethical alternatives whose arrival is becoming ever more urgent.

## Notes

1. Brian Massumi, the translator of *A Thousand Plateaus*, translated the French ‘ritournelle’ as ‘refrain’. As the following pages of this paper will demonstrate, this was a mistake. A refrain is a return of the same (a, R, b, R, c, R), but a ritornello is defined by variation. A refrain connects different elements by means of a repetition of something that is always identical, which is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari argue *against*. Deleuze explicitly indicated that ‘ritournelle’ should be translated with ‘ritornello’, not ‘refrain’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: x). This text will follow Deleuze’s suggestion (and thus all citations including the word ‘ritornello’ are modified translations).
2. ‘Animal and child ritornellos seem to be territorial: therefore they are not “music”’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 303); ‘The role of the ritornello has often been emphasized: it is territorial, a territorial assemblage’ (311); ‘how can a people and a land be made [...] a nation—a ritornello’ (456); ‘We need to see how everyone, at every age, in the smallest things as in the greatest challenges, seeks a territory [...]’. Ritornellos express these powerful dynamisms ...’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 67, 68); ‘you get ritornellos in any territory, marking it out ...’ (Deleuze 1995: 146).
3. See, for example, Cull’s *Deleuze and Performance* (2009), in which the ritornello features prominently, but territory is absent. Conversely, in Hallward’s *Out of this World* (2006) territory is treated extensively, yet without mention of ritornello. Notable exceptions to this separation of the two concepts include the analysis of territory and home in Grosz’s *Chaos, Territory, Art* (2008), the chapter on houses in Ballantyne’s *Deleuze and Guattari for Architects* (2007), and O’Sullivan’s *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari* (2006).
4. See Massumi (1992); Negri (1995); De Landa (2000); Bonta and Protevi (2004). In addition, neither Badiou (2000) nor Žižek (2004) mentions it in their books on Deleuze’s work.
5. ‘The opposition between a pure, signifying, individuated, and culpable subjectivity and a collective, biológico-economic destiny over which consciousness—including social and machinic consciousness—would have to take control is not tenable’ (Guattari 2011: 127).

6. See the opening pages of *Anti-Oedipus*: 'we make no distinction between man and nature [...] man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other ...' (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 4, 5).
7. The same problem is relevant for the recently emerging genres of 'new materialism' and 'speculative realism'. Since in each case, flat ontologies are propagated, theorists find themselves confronted with the same challenge of drawing ethical and political consequences from a metaphysical system that yields no transcendent 'guidelines' on which to base our futures.
8. As Guattari puts it, *ritornello* concerns 'our most intimate temporalization and [...] relation to landscapes and the living world' (2007: 109).
9. 'The political issue subjacent to these questions [of *ritornellos*] appears to us to be the following: is it conceivable that a highly differentiated structuration of behaviors and the *socius* is not necessarily correlative to a constraint of individuals to oppressive hierarchies and a methodological flattering of their spaces of freedom?' (Guattari 2011: 129).
10. I want to thank Professor Ronald Bogue for his feedback on a first draft of this text, as well as the two anonymous reviewers who commented on an earlier version of the full article. Their insightful questions and suggestions were invaluable in arriving at the current text.
11. In a striking parallel, the French philosopher Michel Serres also continuously emphasises the necessity of approaching questions of home and territory in terms of music (2008; 2011). For an extensive analysis of the relation between human territoriality and sound in general, also see Hillel Schwartz's excellent work on noise (2011).
12. For a more extensive, detailed comparison between von Uexküll and Deleuze and Guattari, see Buchanan's *Onto-Ethologies* (2008).
13. In this sense consciousness is also a milieu (Deleuze 1990: 102; Deleuze 2006b: 113) insofar as our 'attention' always draws heterogeneous components (a chair, the table, the coffee cup) into a unity. As such, Deleuze can argue that consciousness as a milieu functions analogous to the 'shot' in cinema (Deleuze 1990: 102).
14. '... a milieu is made up of qualities, substances, powers, and events: the street, for example, with its materials, its noises, its animals or its dramas. The trajectory merges not only with the subjectivity of those who travel through a milieu, but also with the subjectivity of the milieu itself, insofar as it is reflected in those who travel through it' (Deleuze 1997: 61).
15. 'Primitive organisms lived, in some sense, in a state of suffocation. Life had been born, but it had not yet begun to breathe' (Rush 1957: 165).
16. The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk has also provided an excellent analysis of human territoriality in terms of a necessary movement 'from house to house' in his *Weltfremdheit* (1993).
17. Also see 'cadence is only the envelope of a rhythm, and of a relations between rhythms. The reprise of points of inequality, of inflections or of rhythmic events, is more profound than the reproduction of ordinary homogeneous elements' (Deleuze 1994: 21). Similarly, Deleuze argues that in art, Francis Bacon's triptychs have a basic, steady rhythm of colour, but also more profound rhythms of 'climbing, expanding, diastolic, adding value' and 'descending, contracting, systolic, removing value' (Deleuze 2003: xv). Hence rhythm is 'the coexistence of all these movements' (Deleuze 2003: 33). He considers both Cézanne and Bacon to be painters of rhythm understood as simultaneously making a unity visible *and* the 'direct contact with a vital power that exceeds every domain and traverses them all' (Deleuze 2003: 42, 43).

18. This is why Deleuze and Guattari declare ‘meter is dogmatic, but rhythm is critical’ (1987: 313). Dogmatism refers to rationalist metaphysical systems in which the diversity of reality is thought to exist under the auspices of eternal, stable truths of reason. ‘Critical’ refers to the Kantian insistence that (the experience of) any object can only come about by means of synthesis, though in the case of Deleuze and Guattari, this of course does not concern *a priori* syntheses.
19. ‘... we do not yet have a *Territory*, which is not a milieu, nor a rhythm or passage between milieus. The territory is in fact an act that affects milieus and rhythms, that “territorializes” them’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 314). Also see: ‘one is only what one *has*: [...] being is formed [...] by having’ (Deleuze 1994: 79).
20. The concept of ritornello has a modest presence within Deleuze’s thought before the publication of *A Thousand Plateaus*, by invariably being used in a derogatory sense to mock wrongful understanding of Nietzsche’s eternal return as the return of the same (Deleuze 1990: 264; 1994: 6, 242; Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 83).
21. ‘The territory is first of all the critical distance between two beings of the same species: Mark your distance. What is mine is first of all my distance; I possess only distances. Don’t anybody touch me, I growl if anyone enters my territory, I put up placards’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 320).
22. As such, nearly anything can be a ritornello: ‘a manner of walking is no less a ritornello than a song ...’ (Deleuze 1997: 160). Even the movement of a rocking chair can be a ritornello (Deleuze 1997: 161).
23. For Deleuze and Guattari ‘territory’ concerns not just spatial demarcations of borders and access points, but any social formation by which one can attain a sense of being in one’s place: ‘social fields are inextricable knots in which the three movements are mixed up’ (1994: 68).
24. See ‘There is a territory precisely when milieu components cease to be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional to become expressive. There is a territory when the rhythm has expressiveness. What defines the territory is the emergence of matters of expression’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 315).
25. ‘... not all Life is confined to the organic strata’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 503).
26. Also see ‘the territory-house system transforms a number of organic functions—sexuality, procreation, aggression, feeding. But this transformation does not explain the appearance of the territory and the house; rather it is the other way around: the territory implies the emergence of pure sensory qualities, of sensibilia that cease to be merely functional and become expressive features, making possible a transformation of functions’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 183).
27. Hence human religion, social life, property and so on all depend ‘on the raw aesthetic and territorializing factor as its *necessary condition*’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 322; emphasis added).
28. For each ritornello there is always a ‘whole movement of deterritorialization which takes hold of a form and a subject to extract from them variable speeds and floating affects’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 99)
29. ‘A territorial or territorialized component may set about budding, producing ...’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 325).
30. ‘In effect, what holds an assemblage together is not the play of framing forms or linear causalities but, actually or potentially, its most deterritorialized component, a cutting edge of deterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 337)

31. Guattari proposes invasions, wars, epidemics, and capitalism itself as privileged examples of black holes (2011: 111).
32. So on the contrary, components or milieus are always caught in ‘accidents that specify them without however irreversibly attaching them to a context or an evolution pursuing a majestic trajectory’ (Guattari 2011: 132).
33. Hence it is understandable that in his study of Francis Bacon’s paintings, Deleuze emphasises the artist’s denouncement of any use of colour that creates a sense of ‘home’ understood as an entity closed upon itself, as a full ‘intimacy’ or ‘homely atmosphere’, one opposed to styles of painting ‘that will take the image away from the interior and the home’ (Deleuze 2003: 134, 137). Deleuze also finds the concept of ‘home’ as something that is not closed off from an outer world in Stockhausen’s music and Dubuffet’s painting, which ‘do not allow the differences of inside and outside, of public and private, to survive [...] what has changed now is the organization of the home and its nature’ (Deleuze 2006a: 158).
34. ‘... the study of ritornellos deserves special attention because it seems, in fact, that their entry into animal and human assemblages systematically thwarts the rigid oppositions between the acquired and the innate, between a rigorous biological determinism and a freedom of invention’ (Guattari 2011: 116). The latter refers to the idea of sovereign Man intervening in passive Nature and man as rational inventor, the former to the idea that one or several aspects of a living being are not the result of contingent emergence, but rather hardcoded essences.
35. For example, Deleuze and Guattari frequently cite von Uexküll’s description of a tick’s existence. A tick is blind, deaf and mute, but it has a photosensitive skin and a highly developed sense of smell. With this, a tick’s existence concerns only three things: moving up a twig towards light to get a good position, waiting for the smell of an animal and dropping onto that animal to feed. For von Uexküll, what is relevant in the life of the tick is how, when and where it responds to perceptions and signs, significances, because these are the very thing that determine the course of its life. Tick and mammal (motif and counterpoint) create a territory, a home that we cannot *share*, but one that we can *describe and understand*.

## References

- Alliez, Eric (2004) *The Signature of the World – What is Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy?*, trans. by Eliot R. Albert and Alberto Toscano, London: Continuum.
- Badiou, Alain (2000) *Deleuze – The Clamor of Being*, trans. Louise Burchill, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Ballantyne, Andrew (2007) *Deleuze and Guattari for Architects*, London: Routledge.
- Bonta, Mark and John Protevi (2004) *Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Buchanan, Brett (2008) *Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze*, New York, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Cull, Laura (ed.) (2009) *Deleuze and Performance*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- De Landa, Manuel (2000) *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History*, New York, NY: Swerve Editions.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1971) ‘Capitalism, Flows, the Decoding of Flows, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Psychoanalysis, Spinoza’, *Cours Vincennes*, 16 November, available at <http://www.webdeleuze.com> (accessed 28 January 2013).

- Deleuze, Gilles (1986) *Cinema 1–The Movement Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London: Athlone Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1988) *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, New York, NY: Zone Books.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1990) *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester, London: Athlone Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1994) *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1995) *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1997) *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael E. Greco, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (2000) *Proust and Signs*, trans. Richard Howard, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (2003) *Francis Bacon–The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith, London: Continuum.
- Deleuze, Gilles (2004) *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, trans. Mike Taormina, Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e)/MIT Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (2006a) *The Fold–Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley, London: Continuum.
- Deleuze, Gilles (2006b) *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (2007) *Two Regimes of Madness–Texts and Interview 1975–1995*, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e)/MIT Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari (1987) *A Thousand Plateaus–Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2*, trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari (1994) *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari (2000) *Anti-Oedipus–Capitalism and Schizophrenia 1*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet (1987) *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Grosz, Elizabeth A. (2008) *Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Guattari, Félix (1990) ‘Ritornellos and Existential Affects’, trans. Juliana Schiesari and Georges van den Abbeele, *Discourse*, 12:2, pp. 66–81.
- Guattari, Félix (2011) *The Machinic Unconscious*, trans. Taylor Adkins, Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).
- Hallward, Peter (2006) *Out of This World–Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation*, New York, NY: Verso.
- Massumi, Brian (1992) *A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Negri, Antonio (1995) ‘On Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus’, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 18:1, pp. 93–109.
- O’Sullivan, Simon (2006) *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari–Thought beyond Representation*, New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Rush, Joseph H. (1957) *The Dawn of Life*, Garden City, NY: Hanover House.
- Schwartz, Hillel (2011) *Making Noise: From Babel to the Big Bang and Beyond*, New York, NY: Zone Books.
- Serres, Michel (2008) *Le Mal Propre: polluer pour s’approprier?*, Paris: Le Pommier.

Serres, Michel (2011) *Musique*, Paris: Le Pommier.

Sloterdijk, Peter (1993) *Weltfremdheit*, Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Von Uexküll, Jakob (2001a) 'An Introduction to Umwelt', *Semiotica*, 134:1, pp. 107–10.

Von Uexküll, Jakob (2001b) 'The New Concept of Umwelt: A Link between Science and the Humanities', *Semiotica*, 134:1, pp. 111–23.

Žižek, Slavoj (2004) *Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences*, London: Routledge.